Smolensk Crash: Evidence for Explosion
1. Executive summary
January 22, 2015
10 April 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crashed near the city of Smolensk, Russia, killing all 96 people on board. These included President of Poland Lech Kaczyński and his wife Maria, former president Ryszard Kaczorowski, the chief of the Polish General Staff and other senior Polish military officers, the president of the National Bank of Poland, Poland’s deputy foreign minister, Polish government officials, 18 members of the Polish parliament, senior members of the Polish clergy, and relatives of victims of the Katyn massacre. They were en route from Warsaw to attend an event marking the 70th anniversary of the massacre; the site is approximately 12 miles (19 kilometers) west of Smolensk.
According to the official reports the pilots approached Smolensk North Airport, a former military airbase, in thick fog that reduced visibility to about 1,600 feet (500 meters). Excessive vertical rate of descent caused that the aircraft was too low as it approached the runway. When the pilots realized severity of situation they tried to perform go-around maneuverer. The aircraft started to climb reaching the estimated rate of climb around 1181 ft/min (6 m/s) however on the height of 19-22 feet (6-7 m) the left wing hit the large birch tree with a trunk 12 to 16 in (30 to 40 cm) wide. That ripped off about 18 feet (5.5 m) of the left wing, including the left aileron. The resulting asymmetrical lift caused an uncommanded roll to the left. Within 5 seconds, the aircraft hit the ground in the inverted position (150-160° of roll) instantly killing all abroad.
However, many findings gathered during 4.5 years of investigation suggest that the aircraft most probably was destroyed by series of explosions during go-around maneuverer. The following evidence supports the case:
1. Sudden loss of electrical power when the airplane was still flying 49 feet (15 m) over the ground and 230 feet (70 m) before first marks of impact with the ground. This loss of power lead to instantaneous cut off black box recordings and “froze” memory of flight management system (FMS) computer.
2. Total fragmentation of the airplane structure on small and numerous fragments along the flight trajectory in last few hundred yards and the crash site. Fragmentation of the Polish Air Force Tu-154 airplane structure exceeds fragmentation known from high velocity impacts and caused by explosive destruction.
3. Numerous and small airplane fragments found around 656-984 feet (200-300 m) before beginning of the crash site, some of them with evidence of heat.
4. Groups of small airplane fragments found embedded in the ground under acute angle just before the crash site suggesting that high velocity fragments separated from the airplane before hitting the ground
5. Groups of small airplane fragments with the evidence of heat found dozens of yards before the crash site
6. Evidence of heat on several parts of the airplane structure on the crash site
7. Outwardly rolled (“opened”) edges of the large parts of the fuselage suggesting internal pressure as contrast to expecting crushing forces due to impact with the ground
8. Rolled edges of several smaller parts of the aircraft structure section in the direction from inside out, e.g. on the left wing.
9. Instantaneous death of all crew members and passengers due to massive G-force acting on their bodies. Pathological evidence shows that all victims (regardless of the seat location in the airplane) were subjected to the G-force in the range 100-300 G. Measured and calculated G-force during test crashes and similar incidents involving airplanes suggest often survivable 5-10 times weaker accelerations. Also, some bodies were found on the crash site without clothes what suggests blast and/or in-flight breakup.
10. Detection by field asymmetric ion mobility (FAIMS) spectrometers and ion mobility spectrometers (IMS) around 700 positive explosives signals during screening tests taken 2.5 years after the crash.
11. Analytical signals of explosives (mainly RDX, PETN and TNT) found during laboratory tests in around 150 chromatograms from samples taken from the airplane and its equipment 2.5 years after the crash.
2.1 Sudden loss of electrical power
According the official report of the Interstate Aviation Committee (Russian: MAK):
The FMS power was lost (memory frozen) at 10:41:05 at a barocorrected altitude of about 15 m, with IAS 145 knots (about 270 km/h) at N54° 49.483 E032° 03.161. 1
Given geographical coordinates indicate that the electrical power was lost around 164-230 feet (50-70 m) before the crash site. It is also consistent with the altitude 49 feet (15 m) above the ground. At the same time recordings of FDR and CVR stopped. Analysis of flight data from the quick access recorder (the recorder was undamaged and allowed downloading flight data) performed by manufacturer of this device (Advanced Technology Manufacturing in Warsaw) shows that recording stopped 0.5 sec before first contact of the airplane with the ground and 1-1.5 sec before the main impact due to power loss. 2 Neither Russian MAK nor Polish Committee for Investigation of National Aviation Accidents (Polish: PKBWLLP) made no attempts to explain this power loss before the airplane hit the ground.
Comparing few similar cases of incidents involving airplanes it can be seen that CVR devices were able to record initial sounds of impact with the ground:
- Delta Air Lines Flight 191. 2.5 seconds of recordings with sounds of impacts with the ground.
- Delta Air Lines Flight 1141. Almost 4 seconds of recordings with sounds of impacts with the ground. According to the accident report experts identified on the record 4 main impacts.
- United Airlines Flight 232. Clear sound of impact in the ground lasting around 0.3-0.4 sec.
As mentioned CVR record of the Polish Air Force Tu-154 finishes before the airplane hit the ground. Sound record of the last seconds of the flight reveals loud rupturing sound lasting around 6 seconds. Interpretation of this sound differs between Russian and Polish reports. According to the Russian report this sound can be attributed to the impacts with the trees and bushes when the airplane was still in the air. 3 According to the analysis performed by Polish Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police this sound resembles knocking and is accompanied by change in acoustics. 4
According to the analysis performed by Polish Institute of Forensic Research in Krakow for military prosecutor office the sound can be identified as “sound of moving objects” or “sound of items that are displaced”. 5 There is no explanation offered for these disparities in different transcripts. (There are also several other unexplained differences between different transcripts in terms of length of the CVR record and decoded sentences from crew members.)
2.2 Fragmentation of the airframe
According to the ICAO guidelines for investigation of aircraft incidents:
Shattering of metal into very small and numerous fragments and minute deep penetration of a metal surface are not characteristics usually found in aircraft accident wreckage.6
Six months after the incident group of Polish archaeologists was allowed inspecting the crash site. They found massive number of aircraft parts and fragments shattered into small pieces – estimated 60,000 that remain on the crash site.7Comparing number of recovered fragments between different aircraft accidents:
Pan-Am Flight 103 (Lockerbie)
Yes. In-flight explosion: improvised explosive device.
Yes – free fall from 30,000 ft (9,400 m) Additionally explosion of 200,000 lb (91,000 kg) of kerosene (fuel) during impact with the ground.
|Over 11,000 including victims’ personal belongings. 8||90% of the fuselage9|
|TWA Flight 800||
Yes, fuel explosion in the central tank.
Yes – free fall from 13,000 ft (4000 m).
95% of the airplane recovered
No – according to the Russian Report
No – fall from 50-66 feet (15-20m), impact in the muddy ground, vertical velocity 2,362-2,959 feet/min (12-15 m/s)
Over 30,000 actual findings. Estimated 60,000 fragments left on the crash site. Plus, unknown number of fragments in the proximity of the crash-site. Also, unknown number of fragments where the main wreckage is kept at the Smolensk aerodrome.
No reconstruction attempt. Unknown percentage of recovered airframe.
As the contrast below the comparison between Smolensk Tu-154M crash and three similar aircraft accidents:
Smolensk crash (Tu-154M, 10 April 2010). According to the Polish report on impacting the ground, the airplane was in an inverted position with a bank angle of about -150 and a pitch angle of -6 (aircraft’s nose was slightly lowered). 11 Other flight parameters just before the impact were as follow:
- Horizontal velocity approx. 140 knots (260 km/h)
- Vertical velocity 2,362-2,959 feet/min (12-15 m/s)
- Trajectory angle with respect to the ground: 10°-12°
- No fireball of post-crash fire during and after impact, only small isolated fires.
As Polish report confirms “this type of crash is classified as a low energy low angle impact”.12 Moreover, “the swampy ground and shrubbery suppressed energy of the impact”.13
Scandinavian Airlines Flight 751 (McDonnell Douglas MD-81, Göttrora 27 December 1991). Failure of both engines on the latitude around 3281 feet (1000 m). Emergency landing on the frozen field after cutting around 400 feet (125 m) of the forest. The airplane hit the ground with right roll 40° with velocity 108 knots (200 km/h). On impact the fuselage broke into three parts. The indentations in the underside structure were largest in the left of the front part – approx. 31.5 in (80 cm) – and smallest in the right rear part – approx. 7 in (18 cm). All 129 on board survived. Except for four persons, all made their way out of the aircraft themselves.
Aviastar Flight 1906 (Tu-204, Domodedovo, 22 March 2010). Missed landing approach in fog and poor visibility, crash in the forest with velocity 156 knots (290 km/h). The fuselage broke in 3 main parts. Four crew members were seriously injured. The remaining four were also injured, but just slightly.
China Airline Flight CI642 (McDonnell Douglas MD-11, Hong Kong 22 August 1999). Hard impact with the ground during landing with the speed 152 knots (281 km/h) resulting right main landing gear collapsed outward, causing damage to the right wing assembly, resulting in its failure. As the right wing separated, spilled fuel was ignited and the aircraft rolled inverted. From total of 219 persons of whom 3 died, 50 were seriously injured and 153 sustained minor injuries.
Below graphical comparison between discussed cases. Clearly, supposedly similar crash conditions caused very different outcomes:
2.3 Pattern of destruction
2.3.1 Debris distribution
Investigators identified large number of small fragments of the airplane not only on the crash site but also on the ground under flight path in the last few hundred yards. Russian prosecutor report from inspection of the crash site and its proximity from 10 April 2010 (i.e. the crash date) describes numerous small metallic parts of the airplane found along flight trajectory 328-656 feet (100-200 m) before beginning of the crash site. 14 A report prepared for Polish chief military prosecutor office report states that some parts of the airplane were found around 1,312 feet (400 m) before beginning of the crash site, before supposed start of the airframe decomposition due to impact with the large birch tree. 15 All these findings were left uncommented in the official reports. None of these fragments was subject to any metallurgical and/or forensic analysis.
Mentioned earlier report of Polish archaeologists describes also following findings:
- groups of small fragments embedded in the ground up to 2 in (5 cm) under acute angle before first marks of contact of the airplane with the ground. 16 That suggests small fragments falling from the airplane with high velocity.
- numerous fragments of the airplane structure found before beginning of the crash site, some of them with evidence of heat, some of them with sharply fractured edges: 17
- Fragments of bones and other human remains. 18
All these findings were left uncommented in the official reports. None of these fragments was subject to any metallurgical and/or forensic analysis.
2.3.2 Rolled edges
Large part of the fuselage was found on the crash site inverted in outwardly rolled out edges. That suggests internal pressure acting from inside out:
Expected during impact with the ground crushing forces are acting in the opposite direction as documented for instance in the crash test:
Taken from: Fasanella, E. and Alfaro-Bou, E. (1986) “Vertical drop test of a transport fuselage section located aft of the wing”. NASA Technical Memorandum 89025, p. 13.
Finite element analysis performed by Dr. Gregory Szuladzinski (Analytical Service) where part of the fuselage was modeled in the inverted position suggest that this pattern of destruction (externally rolled edges) is attributed to the explosion inside the fuselage: 19
Rolled edges were also documented in other debris as for example in the left wing:
And in the part of the airplane slat found before first marks of contact of the airplane with the ground:
Sharp, rolled edges and evidence of heat.
None of those parts and fragments was subject to any metallurgical and/or forensic analysis.
Similar rolled edges were found in debris of Boeing 777 Flight MH17:
Dutch Safety Board interpreted this pattern of destruction as follows:
[…] material around the holes was deformed in a manner consistent with being punctured by high-energy objects.20
Russian prosecutor report from inspection of the crash site and its proximity from 10 April 2010 describes also destruction both wings of the airplane in the middle and outer sections. Internal structure of wings (spars, ribs, etc.), parts of flaps and top skin in some wing sections were shattered, some into small pieces. 21 The report suggest as the cause fluid hammer phenomena, i.e. impact with the ground caused pressure wave from remains of fluid in the tanks and this wave mechanically destroyed parts of the wings. This explanation is surprising as in the middle and outer tanks only small amount of fuel remained. According to the Polish investigation report most of the fuel at the time of crash 23,369 lb (10 600 kg) was in the central tanks whereas middle and outer tanks were almost completely empty:
The middle wing housed fuel tank 4 with 6,000 kg of fuel and fuel tank 1, also with fuel in a quantity exceeding 3,000 kg. 22
All these fragments and parts never were subject of metallurgical and/or forensic analysis.
2.4 Instantaneous death of all on board due to massive G-force
According to the Polish investigation report all victims (regardless of the seat location in the airplane) were subject to massive longitudinal (along X axis of the airplane) acceleration of minimum 100 G:
According to the trajectory which the aircraft followed on the surface of the ground, the flight-crew were subject to impact acceleration along the X axis (back-to-chest). Assessing the character of injuries of crew members‘ heads, chests and spines, their bodies were given a surge load not smaller than 100 G.
The cause of death of 8 members of the crew and 88 passengers was massive multi-organ trauma due to deceleration force on the impact of the aircraft against the ground. 23
Note the phrase “not smaller than 100 G”. The report specifies minimal threshold but does not define upper limits. Basic autopsies after the crash revealed that many bodies were badly fragmented what suggest loads several hundred G:
Taken from: Cogswell, S.C. (1998) “Aviation Pathology Notes” [in:] Injury Prevention in Aircraft Crashes: Investigative Techniques and Applications, Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development Lecture Series 2018, p. 6.
Fragments of internal organs were also found embedded deeply in the muddy ground in the front part of the crash site.
Such G-forces (minimum 100 G) due to longitudinal deceleration are however highly unlikely knowing results of the full scale crash tests, effects of similar aircraft crashes and calculated accelerations in similar cases.
2.4.1 Comparison with similar cases and results of test crashes
Comparison with similar cases and results of full scale test crashes suggests 5-10 times smaller longitudinal acceleration compared with Smolensk crash. Conditions during impact of Tu-154M with the ground:
- Horizontal velocity ca. 140 knots (260 km/h)
- Vertical velocity 2,362-2,959 feet/min (43-54 km/h)
- Trajectory angle with respect to the ground: 10 -12
As Polish report confirms: “this type of crash is classified as a low energy low angle impact”. Moreover: “the swampy ground and shrubbery suppressed energy of the impact”.24
After earlier discussed Göttrora incident Swedish investigation board SHK performed simulation of the course of the crash.25
The study was carried out by the Cranfield Impact Centre (CIC) and the Motor Industry Research Association (MIRA) both in the UK. Using known details of the aircraft speed, attitude, roll angle and mass distribution during the course of the accident CIC calculated loads in different directions for a number of positions in the aircraft. Because most of personal injuries occurred in the front part of the aircraft calculations concentrated mainly on this part. The results were as follows:
- longitudinal accelerations (along X axis): between -13.5 and -20 G
- lateral (transverse) accelerations (along Y axis): between ± 3.7 and ±5 G
- vertical (normal) accelerations (along Z axis): between +29 and +30 G
Majority of the passengers and crew were able to make their way out of the aircraft themselves.
July 19, 1989 McDonnell Douglass DC-10 United Airlines Flight 232 crash-landed in Sioux City, Iowa, suffering catastrophic loss of all flight controls. The airplane hit the ground with pitch down and right roll position with horizontal velocity approx. 240 knots (440 km/h) and sink rate approx. 1,850 feet per minute (34 km/h). Out of 296 persons on board 185 survived with 111 fatalities (35 victims died due to smoke inhalation in the post-crash fire). Despite much greater speed compared with Smolensk crash (140 knots) many passengers and crew members survived, few of them unharmed. Also, the aircraft broke into five main sections but nothing that resembles almost total fragmentation of Tu-154M during Smolensk crash.
1 December 1984 FAA and NASA performed at Edwards AFB, California the full scale transport controlled impact demonstration using remotely controlled Boeing 720. The airplane was fitted with dummy “passengers” and sensors that measured structural loads during the impact both on airframe and dummies. The aircraft impacted in the ground with horizontal velocity 150 knots (278 km/h) and vertical velocity 1,024 feet per minute (19 km/h). Measured loads were as follows:
27 April 2012 another full scale test airplane crash took place where remotely controlled Boeing 727 crashed into Sonora desert, Mexico. The jetliner hit the ground at approx. 122 knots (230 km/h), with a descent rate of 1,500 feet per minute (27 km/h). Prof. John Hansman from the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics of Massachusetts Institute of Technology who participated in this project in the interview with Polish media stated that peak recorded accelerations occurred in the front part of the cabin with the highest value of 12 G dipping to 9G in the middle and 6G at the back. 26
Above: Wreckage of B727 (structurally very similar to Tu-154M) after the test crash
In the light of these findings longitudinal decelerations of minimum 100 G that acted on victims of Smolensk crash look highly unlikely. There are however measured accelerations more than 100 G acting on the body during explosion. Below graph of accelerations (G) in the function of time measured in the dummy pelvis from the test involving explosion of IED under a vehicle:
Taken from: Krzystała, E., Mężyk, A., Kciuk, S. (2011) on wheeled military vehicles and their crew . Szybkobieżne Pojazdy Gąsienicowe vol. 28, No 16 Analysis of the influence of the blast 2, p. 10. URL:http://www.obrum.gliwice.pl/spg/211/10_Krzystala_Mezyk_Kciuk.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
Majority of the bodies were not subjected to any detailed pathological examination neither in Russia nor in Poland and were buried immediately after transportation.
2.5 Sharp and erratic record of accelerations
Recorded in the flight data recorder traces of vertical (red curve) and lateral (top violet curve) accelerations show in the last seconds of flight erratic pattern with sharp negative and positive spikes:
Taken from: Interstate Aviation Committee. Final Report, (2011) p. 70.
According to the ICAO guidelines for investigation of aircraft incidents such sudden jumps although cannot provide definitive proof by itself may indicate explosion:
The abrupt cessation of the date recorder, sometimes accompanied by a short and wild diversion of the traces, is nearly always due to the cutting off of power by rupturing of the electrical supply cables. Such a rupture may be caused by airframe structural failure or the detonation of an explosive device. A sharp spike on the ‘g’ acceleration trace, positive or negative to the normal, has been observed at the moment of cut-off on occasions when an internal explosion has been established. This spike is very different in character and timing from that associated with flight turbulence and is probably caused by very rapid vibration of the ‘g’ transducer which is normally mounted on the airframe structure close to the center of gravity of the aircraft.27
2.6 Detection of explosive traces by mobile spectrometers (IMS and FAIMS)
Growing doubts about the course of events during Smolensk crash lead Polish Chief Military Prosecution Office to send to Smolensk, where the wreckage is still stored, in autumn 2012 (2.5 years after the crash) group of experts in order to take samples from debris for forensic examination. During on field screening tests 3 different mobile spectrometers positively identified around 700 signals from explosives. Two used devices worked in the FAIMS mode: MO-2M (Sibel) and Pilot-M (Russian production Ławada-Ju). One used device worked in the IMS mode: Hardened Mobile Trace (Safran Morpho).
Official report for Chief Military Prosecution Office claimed later that all these signals were false positives, however experts in their report acknowledged that they are not able to identify substances that caused so many false positive signals. 28
2.7 Analytical signals of explosives during laboratory analysis
Samples taken from debris were stored in Moscow for around 6 months and then shipped to Warsaw for examination in the Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police. Samples were analyzed by 4 methods:
- gas chromatography thermal energy analysis (GC-TEA)
- gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GC-MS)
- gas chromatography with electron capture detector (GC-ECD)
- high-performance liquid chromatography with photo-diode array detection (HPLC- DAD).
First report submitted 23 December 2013 to the Chief Military Prosecution Office by experts from Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police stated that no traces of explosives were found. 29 However, two chemists from the Warsaw University Prof. Krystyna Kamienska-Trela and Prof. Sławomir Szymański pointed that on the actual chromatograms attached to the report there are several analytical signals that correspond with the peaks from explosive analytes in the sample:
- For GC-ECD there were around 150 samples with detected signal of a substance corresponding to the pattern signal of RDX (hexogen).
- For majority of these samples also GC-TEA detected a peak corresponding to the pattern peak of RDX.
- For HPLC-DAD (device working in automated mode) there were 112 detections of explosives (20.6% of all analyzed samples): 72 detections of PETN, 53 2,6-DNB, 2 detections of tetryl, TNT and RDX, and 1 detection of TNB and 2am4,6DNTn.
All these detections were left uncommented in the original report. Subsequently Chief Military Prosecution Office officially requested explanation from the Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police about these detections. In the answer submitted 28 March 2014 by experts from the Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police they acknowledged presence of the analytical signals corresponding to explosives but claimed that all of these were false positives. Particularly phthalate esters were to blame for false positives with diisobutyl phthalate (DIBP) giving a peak signal overlapping with the peak from RDX. According to the Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police it was not possible to separate the chromatographic band of diisobutyl phthalate from the band of RDX.
This explanation was heavily criticized by Kamienska-Trela and Szymanski. Analytical signals of RDX were detected also by GC-TEA analyzer. According to the manufacturer of this device (Ellutia 800 Series) the analyzer is uniquely sensitive to those samples which contain nitrogen. As diisobutyl phthalate (molecular formula C16H22O4) does not contain nitrogen it is not possible to detect such substance by properly used GC-TEA analyzer. Kamienska-Trela and Szymanski contacted also directly the manufacturer and asked whether it is possible for this analyzer to detect phthalates. The answer was as follows: if the device is used according to its purpose such detection is impossible.
Above the chromatogram GC-TEA for the sample 4-287 with explosive standards in the background. Highlighted in red peaks which may correspond to the explosives. The peak corresponding to RDX was later labeled manually on the chromatogram as FDiB (diisobutyl phthalate) even if this analyzer under normal operational conditions cannot detect suchsubstance. Taken from: Opinia uzupełniająca II do opinii do opinii E-che-90/12 z przeprowadzonych badań chemicznych, p. 13/19.
URL: http://www.npw.internetdsl.pl/Dokumenty/01.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
Kamienska-Trela and Szymanski showed also results of their own analyses where they challenged claim that chromatographic bands from RDX and diisobutyl phthalate cannot be separated. In fact these bands can be separated quite easily using both gas and liquid chromatography by changing settings and length of the chromatographic column.
Kamienska-Trela and Szymanski performed statistical analysis of chromatograms from the report with supposed false positives due to phthalates. On the graph below on the Y axis intensity of a signal for dibutyl phthalate for GC-TEA method; on the X axis concentration of determined by GC-MS method. As expected, growing concentration of dibutyl phthalate does not increase intensity of the signal from the GC-TEA analyzer. For higher concentrations the intensity of the signal oscillates around 0. Therefore detected signals must come from not dibutyl phthalate but from substances that contain nitrogen instead.
Taken from: Krystyna Kamieńska-Trela Presentation at III Smolensk Conference, October 2014 Warsaw.
Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that the aircraft most probably was destroyed by series of explosions during go-around maneuverer on the altitude 100-200 feet (30-60 m) above the ground.
1. Interstate Aviation Committee. Final Report, (2011) p. 107. URL: http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/tu-154m_101/finalreport_eng.pdf. Last accessed: 04 January 2015.
2. ATM PP, (2011) Ekspertyza techniczna. Deszyfracja i analiza danych pokładowych rejestratorów parametrów samolotu Tu154M nr boczny 101 Sił Powietrznych RP, który uległ katastrofie 10 kwietnia 2010 r., p. 23. URL: http://tinyurl.com/lk7tfnj. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
3 Transcript from the cockpit. URL: http://doc.rmf.pl/rmf_fm/store/Transkrypcja_rozmow.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
4 Odpis korespondencji pokładowej z rejestratora fonicznego MARS-BM samolotu Tu-154M nr 101 zarejestrowanej w dniu 10.04.2010 roku. URL: http://www.faktysmolensk.gov.pl/przebieg-badania?file=files/pliki/raport/Zalacznik_nr_8_-_Odpis_korespondencji_pokladowej.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
5 Zapis z rejestratora fonicznego CVR. URL: http://www.npw.internetdsl.pl/Dokumenty/IES-odczyt1.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
6 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation. Part III – Investigation. ICAO, Doc 9756-AN/965. III-19-6, 19.2.4, p. 524.
7. Prospekcja terenowa miejsca katastrofy Tu-154M pod Smoleńskiem z użyciem metod stosowanych w archeologii. Raport końcowy (2010) Instytut Archeologii i Etnologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa 2010, p. 51-52; URL:http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/ZespolSmolenskMedia.nsf/files/ZSMK-9GMS8P/%24File/tom_207.pdf; Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
8. Black, S., Sunderland, G., Hackman, L., Mallett, X. (2011) Disaster Victim Identification: Experience and Practice, CRC Press, p. 100
9. Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Report on the accident to Boeing 747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988. Aircraft Accident Report No 2/90 (EW/C1094), 1.12.2.
10. National Transportation Safety Board. (2000) In-flight Breakup Over The Atlantic Ocean, Trans World Airlines Flight 800, Boeing 747-131, N93119, Near East Moriches, New York, July 17, 1996. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-00/03, Appendix D: Document Management Tags Database Information. Washington, DC, p. 369.
11. Final Report – Annex 5. Description of Damage to the Aircraft, p. 5/25. URL: http://mswia.datacenter- poland.pl/AnnexesToTheFinalReport.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
12. Ibid. p. 5/25.
13. Ibid. p. 5/25
14. Nowaczyk, K. (2014) Śledztwo rosyjskiego rządu Władimira Putina w sprawie katastrofy polskiego samolotu rządowego w Smoleńsku, p. 21. URL: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/ZespolSmolenskMedia.nsf/files/ZSMK- 9RHHD7/%24File/Sledztwo_rzadu_Putina.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
15. Opinia uzupełniająca II do opinii do opinii E-che-90/12 z przeprowadzonych badań chemicznych, p. 10/19. URL:http://www.npw.internetdsl.pl/Dokumenty/01.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
16. Prospekcja terenowa miejsca katastrofy Tu-154M… p. 45.
17. Prospekcja terenowa miejsca katastrofy Tu-154M… p. 45.
18. Prospekcja terenowa miejsca katastrofy Tu-154M… p. 23.
19. Szuladzinski, G. (2014) “Explosive bursting of an aircraft fuselage”. Technical Note No. 69. URL:http://tinyurl.com/lvxabtw. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
20. Dutch Safety Board (2014) “Preliminary report. Crash involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 flight MH17”, p. 24. URL: http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/701/b3923acad0ceprem-rapport-mh-17-en- interactief.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
21. Document of Chief Military Prosecutor Office No k. 49998 (left wing description) and No k. 50024 and k. 50025 (right wing description).
22. Final Report – Annex 5… p. 6/25.
23. Committee for Investigation of National Aviation Accidents (2011) “Final Report from the examination of the aviation accident no 192/2010/11 involving the Tu-154M airplane, tail number 101, which occurred on April 10th, 2010 in the area of the Smolensk North airfield”, p. 78. URL: http://mswia.datacenter-poland.pl/FinalReportTu- 154M.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
24. Final Report – Annex 5… p. 5/25.
25. SHK, (1993) Air Traffic Accident on 27 December 1991 at Göttrora, AB Contry. Report C: 1993:57, p. 55.
26. 100 g – kolejne kłamstwo raportu Millera: korespondencja z Maciejem Laskiem i rozmowa z prof. Johnem Hansmanem z MIT. URL: http://nowypolskishow.co.uk/?p=1154. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
27. Manual of Aircraft Accident…, III-19-4, 19.2.2, p. 522.
28. Opinia uzupełniająca II do opinii do opinii E-che-90/12 z przeprowadzonych badań chemicznych, p. 9/19. URL:http://www.npw.internetdsl.pl/Dokumenty/01.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.
29. Opinia nr E-che-90/12 z przeprowadzonych badań chemicznych, p. 71/217. URL:http://www.npw.internetdsl.pl/Dokumenty/01.pdf. Last accessed: 4 January 2015.